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Introduction
Reflecting on the past two decades of global health governance, scholars highlight two major 
trends – especially in relation to lethal infectious disease outbreaks. First, there is a growing 
political tendency to frame such outbreaks as security threats. Driven by concerns about 
emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases, drug-resistant strains of known diseases 
and the proliferation of biological weapons, health threats are argued to have an impact on 
national and international security. The stated reasons for this include the fact that high levels 
of morbidity and mortality can affect the operations of the state, disturb the global economy 
by interrupting travel and trade, and threaten military operations. Beginning in the 1980s 
in the USA, the discourse on ‘health security’ was soon picked up by other governments, 
notably in Australia, Canada and Western Europe, as well as by international organisations, 
including the World Health Organization (WHO). In response to these events the framing of 
health as a security issue has become an important field of study, with scholars analysing 
the processes through which health issues are ‘securitised’, the extent to which this trend is 
normatively and politically desirable and – more recently – the complex interplay between 
dynamics of securitisation and de-securitisation in global health policy.
© 2016 The author(s). Published by Taylor & Francis
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ABSTRACT
The international Ebola response mirrors two broader trends in global 
health governance: (1) the framing of infectious disease outbreaks as a 
security threat; and (2) a tendency to respond by providing medicines 
and vaccines. This article identifies three mechanisms that interlink 
these trends. First, securitisation encourages technological policy 
responses. Second, it creates an exceptional political space in which 
pharmaceutical development can be freed from constraints. Third, it 
creates an institutional architecture that facilitates pharmaceutical 
policy responses. The ways in which the securitisation of health 
reinforces pharmaceutical policy strategies must, the article concludes, 
be included in ongoing efforts to evaluate them normatively and 
politically.
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That notable trend towards securitisation in global health governance has also been 
accompanied by a second one – a growing recourse by policy makers to pharmaceutical 
responses and solutions in managing such global health issues. This second trend largely 
centres on the provision of medicines and vaccines as a key instrument of global health 
governance. Thus increasing the availability of – and international access to – pharmaceu-
ticals is now a core mandate of many of the global health institutions that have emerged in 
the past 25 years. These include the US president’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), 
the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, GAVI, more than two dozen prod-
uct development partnerships, the WHO Prequalification Programme, and the WHO Global 
Pandemic Influenza Action Plan.
At the national level, furthermore, the USA has taken the lead by creating the so-called 
Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise (PHEMCE), which promotes 
the development and national procurement of medicines and vaccines against health-based 
threats.1 Other governments, notably from Australia, Canada, various European counties and 
Japan, have followed suit and created their own policy frameworks on health security, which 
include measures to facilitate the use of medicines and vaccines to counter global health 
security threats. This growing emphasis on pharmaceutical response strategies means that 
global health policy is today not just a site of securitisation alone, but simultaneously a site 
of ‘pharmaceuticalisation’ as well.
The twin trends towards securitisation and pharmaceuticalisation in global health gov-
ernance are now becoming increasingly well understood in their own terms, with separate 
groups of scholars exploring each trend respectively. What has so far escaped scholarly 
attention, however, is how these two pivotal dynamics are also profoundly interlinked in 
practice, and indeed tend to reinforce one another. This lacuna is the result, in part, of the 
fact that the scholarship on securitisation and pharmaceuticalisation has different discipli-
nary origins and roots, with scholars in both fields tending to work independently of one 
another. At the risk of oversimplifying, scholars of securitisation have simply not paid much 
attention to the growing role pharmaceuticals now play in global health policy, while schol-
ars of pharmaceuticalisation in turn have not focused on recent developments in security 
policy and the rise of health security. Against that backdrop, this article undertakes the first 
analysis of how the dual processes of securitisation and pharmaceuticalisation are linked 
in contemporary global health governance. In particular, the article examines whether the 
securitisation of health issues promotes or facilitates pharmaceutical responses to infectious 
disease outbreaks, and – if so – how.
The international response to the recent Ebola outbreak in West Africa emerges as a critical 
site for carrying out such an analysis. As the article will show at the outset, the dynamics 
of both securitisation and pharmaceuticalisation have been pervasive in the international 
response to the recent Ebola outbreak. Efforts to respond to the outbreak mobilised a num-
ber of securitisation strategies, while at the same time also being an important site for the 
development of new pharmaceutical strategies for responding to the Ebola outbreak. Based 
on a detailed analysis of the international response, the article then goes on to identify 
three ways in which securitisation processes tend to facilitate pharmaceutical responses to 
infectious disease outbreaks. First, we argue, securitisation encourages technological policy 
responses, which in the field of global health policy tend to give pharmaceutical strategies 
greater salience. Second, securitisation also creates an exceptional political space in which 
the development, approval and administration of new pharmaceutical interventions can 
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be freed from many constraints. Third, the framing of health as a security issue over the 
past two decades has created a set of policies and legal institutions that facilitate the use 
of pharmaceuticals as a key instrument of global health policy. These ways in which the 
securitisation of infectious diseases reinforces pharmaceutical policy responses in global 
health governance must, the article concludes, be included in the ongoing process of their 
normative and political evaluation.
Déjà Vu: Ebola as the latest securitisation of infectious disease
On 8 August 2014 WHO declared the Ebola outbreak a Public Health Emergency of 
International Concern. The Emergency Committee convened by WHO under the International 
Health Regulations (2005) advised that heads of states with Ebola transmission ‘should 
declare a national emergency,2 something several countries in West Africa did in the fol-
lowing weeks, including the worst affected countries – Sierra leone, liberia and Guinea – but 
also nigeria, where only 19 people would become infected overall. liberia and Sierra leone 
also used military units to enforce quarantines and suppress riots.
The language of security was also employed by political leaders outside the immediately 
affected region. On 7 September US President Obama called the outbreak a ‘national security 
priority’;3 shortly afterwards he announced plans to send 3000 military personnel into the 
region. In the following weeks China, France and the UK similarly announced the deploy-
ment of military personnel and equipment to West Africa. Even nGOs such as Médecins Sans 
Frontières and Oxfam, usually critical of military intervention, could see no other way forward 
than calling for the deployment of military medical capability. Importantly the United nations 
Security Council declared on 18 September 2014 that the Ebola outbreak constituted ‘a threat 
to international peace and security’.4
The securitisation of the international Ebola response is consistent with a much longer 
trend in global health governance. In fact, the rapid expansion of security agendas to incor-
porate health-based threats has received extensive scholarly attention.5 The framing of global 
health as an issue of security has mostly been analysed through the lens of securitisation 
theory,6 which uses the insights of speech act theory to analyse security issues.7 Specifically 
securitisation theory analyses what effects it has when an issue is framed as a security threat. 
The theory emphasises that ‘language can […] do much more than just convey information’ 
and ‘constitute a form of action or social activity’.8 Securitising an issue, in other words, means 
more than saying something, it does something.
Existing scholarly literature on securitisation in the field of global health has highlighted 
some of the political effects of securitisation processes on policy priorities, policy proce-
dures and even the institutional structure of global health governance.9 Furthermore, that 
scholarship has explored the extent to which the securitisation of infectious diseases is 
politically desirable, ie whether the trend towards securitisation should be encouraged.10 
More recently it has also begun to analyse the interplay between dynamics of securitisation 
and de-securitisation in the area of global health policy.11 Viewed against the background of 
this growing body of scholarship, the international response to Ebola emerges as the most 
recent manifestation of the securitisation of global health, and as one consistent with a 
longer history of securitising infectious diseases already seen in the cases of HIV/AIDS, SARS 
and pandemic flu. In the case of Ebola, however, that is only part of the story.
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Where are the drugs and vaccines? The pharmaceutical response to Ebola
The international response to Ebola is also consistent with a second major trend in global 
health governance – the growing recourse to pharmaceutical logics and responses in global 
health policy. Thus, and in parallel to framing the Ebola outbreak as a security issue, an 
international pharmaceutical response also began to unfold rapidly. On 11 August, only 
three days after WHO had declared a Public Health Emergency of International Concern, 
the Organisation convened a meeting to decide whether it would be ethical to treat Ebola 
patients with experimental drug compounds that had never been tested in humans. Given 
the disease’s high mortality rate, the meeting concluded that it was.12 now the race was on 
among governments, companies and nongovernmental organisations to find a pharmaceu-
tical solution to the Ebola outbreak.
A further WHO meeting held in early September then agreed on a list of experimental 
drugs and vaccines whose development should be prioritised.13 Funding for taking things 
forward was provided by a range of organisations – including national governments, research 
councils, philanthropic organisations and partnerships for financing health development.14 
To plan and coordinate clinical trials in Africa, Europe and the USA, new public–private part-
nerships, spanning organisations from several countries, were created.15 yet further efforts 
went into creating the regulatory pathways necessary for the accelerated development of 
new drugs and vaccines. Rules and standards were discussed for how to run clinical trials 
in emergency situations and how to harmonise regulation for the approval of clinical trials 
and end products internationally to enable simultaneous development and distribution of 
new drugs and vaccines.
In some respects this intense focus on a pharmaceutical response is puzzling, because it 
seemed highly unlikely that any of these drugs and vaccines could actually be used in the 
outbreak.16 All of them were in the very early stages of development, and even the most 
optimistic forecasts did not envisage that they would become available for widespread use 
during the outbreak. Moreover, many public health experts pointed out that contact tracing 
and isolation had been the key methods of success in the containment of previous outbreaks 
– leading to the question of why – largely unavailable – drugs and vaccines attracted so 
much attention in the latest Ebola outbreak.
This intense focus on pharmaceutical strategies means that the international response 
to Ebola has not just been a site of securitisation, but also one of pharmaceuticalisation. The 
international Ebola response, in other words, shows evidence not just of a proliferation of 
security logics, but also points towards an intensification – and indeed international expan-
sion – of pharmaceutical logics, rationalities and interventions in global health policy. The 
pharmaceuticalisation in global health governance has not received nearly as much attention 
in the scholarly literature as the securitisation phenomenon. However, an emerging literature 
is now beginning to capture and analyse this phenomenon. For example, Elbe et al show that 
the securitisation of health has ‘intensified government interest in acquiring pharmaceutical 
defenses for their populations’.17 The key role pharmaceuticals have come to play as a policy 
instrument in global health security18 – and in global health governance more widely19 – has 
been explored mainly through the conceptual lens of ‘pharmaceuticalisation’.
This concept was first developed by scholars from sociology and anthropology, who 
observed an increase in recourse to pharmaceutical products in various areas of social life 
and who analyse these dynamics and their drivers and implications.20 The literature has 
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postulated a number of potential drivers of pharmaceuticalisation. For example, scientific 
and technological advances in biomedicine are identified as an important factor, because 
they enable novel pharmaceutical products to be developed.21 The sheer possibility that 
exists today of addressing health problems through pharmaceutical products that were not 
available previously has helped propel drugs and vaccines to the top of the health policy 
agenda. Second, Peter Conrad also argues that a broader ‘medicalization of existence’ is 
a relevant driver of pharmaceuticalisation because it encourages a tendency to address 
complex issues through recourse to pharmaceutical therapies.22 Finally, several studies have 
emphasised that marketing and direct-to-consumer advertising by pharmaceutical compa-
nies can increase the societal penetration of pharmaceutical products.23
Some of this scholarship on pharmaceuticalisation even looks directly at how various polit-
ical factors can contribute to pharmaceuticalisation processes. Williams et al and Abraham 
highlight the role of expedited approaches to the approval of pharmaceuticals pursued 
by some government regulatory agencies, and how this is making more pharmaceuticals 
available.24 Elbe et al also show how national governments, international organisations, 
philanthropic organisations and cross-sectoral partnerships have facilitated the use of 
pharmaceuticals in global health policy by providing financial and regulatory incentives 
to encourage pharmaceutical companies to invest in the development of pharmaceuticals 
for which limited commercial opportunities exist.25 In a different article Elbe and his col-
leagues looked beyond specific policy and regulatory incentives to analyse the underlying 
rationalities of political rule within which pharmaceuticals have emerged as such attractive 
policy instruments. Drawing on Michel Foucault’s notion of a ‘crisis of circulation’, they argue 
that pharmaceuticals are such an attractive policy option because they allow for the rapid 
interception of ‘bad’ and, in this case, pathogenic systems of circulation without disrupting 
the ‘good’ circulatory systems that are deemed critical for maintaining population welfare, 
such as mobility, commerce and trade.26
notwithstanding this interest in the political drivers of pharmaceuticalisation, however, 
neither scholars of securitisation nor those of pharmaceuticalisation have so far been able 
to capture and analyse how these two parallel dynamics are interlinked in practice. Do 
securitisation processes tend to favour pharmaceutical responses to infectious diseases 
outbreaks? If so, what are the principal mechanisms or trajectories along which they do 
this? Focusing specifically on the analysis of the international Ebola response, we identify 
three such underlying mechanisms linking the framing of health as a security problem with 
a policy response focused on pharmaceuticals: (1) provoking a greater impetus for techno-
logical policy solutions; (2) creating an exceptional political space where the processes of 
pharmaceutical development, approval and administration can be freed from many con-
straints; and (3) creating a lasting institutional architecture that facilitates the recourse to 
pharmaceuticals as a key instrument of global health policy.
Searching for a quick fix: the race for technological solutions
In the first instance securitisation processes tend to encourage ‘quick-fix’ and therefore often 
technologically driven responses. As has been widely noted by securitisation theorists, pro-
cesses of securitisation invoke a sense of imminent danger. Buzan and Waever point out more 
generally that ‘a security issue is posited (by a securitising actor) as a threat to the survival 
of some referent object (national, state, the liberal economic order, the rain forests), which 
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is claimed to have a right to survive…a question of survival necessarily involves a point of 
no return at which it will be too late to act’.27 In other words, the process of securitisation 
promotes the perception of an immediate, potentially irreversible danger that creates a 
perceived need for rapid response. In a situation perceived as an emergency alternative 
policy options, such as a long-term engagement with complex socioeconomic issues and 
political negotiations, for instance, appear less suitable. Demand increases for a quick fix to 
avert the imminent danger.
That securitisation processes privilege certain policy pathways over others has already 
been noted in the literature. nunes argues that ‘framing issues as threats to security entails 
the establishment of a political modality for dealing with them’.28 Craig Calhoun highlights 
the rise of emergency as a mode of justification for urgent global intervention.29 Such emer-
gency interventions, he argues, are short-term and focus on mitigating a temporally circum-
scribed event. Although the field of health was not one of the initial sectors studied by early 
securitisation theorists, there is evidence that this effect takes place in global health policy as 
well. There, too, securitisation processes have promoted such an emergency mode of gov-
ernance or, as Weir and Mykhalovskiy put it, a ‘World on Alert’.30 Indeed, Stephen Collier and 
Andrew lakoff argue that the securitisation of health has fostered an ‘emergency modality 
of intervention’.31 In addition to creating a sense of urgency and emergency, they also show 
that the securitisation of global health has promoted interventionist policy responses. More 
specifically it has promoted interventions that can be launched rapidly and are applicable 
in different contexts by using standardised protocols and technologies. In that sense, the 
field of global health remains consistent with the broader findings of securitisation theory.
The need, then, to rapidly intervene and urgently stop the threat is one way in which 
securitisation processes tend to emphasise technological responses in the area of global 
health – rather than encouraging longer-term strategies of dealing with underlying socioec-
onomic and political drivers. It is, however, not the only the reason. For, in the field of global 
health policy, such interventionist policies are particularly difficult to implement because 
the source of the threat is often located in other countries. As McInnes points out, the link 
between health and security has been ‘generally cast in terms of a response to exogenous 
developments, that new risks have emerged and have acquired added salience in the context 
of accelerated globalization’.32 Increasing economic interconnectedness, the accelerated 
mobility of people and goods, and international military operations have played a crucial 
role in the construction of health as a security issue.33 Indeed, even the first international 
conferences linking health and security were driven by states’ concerns about cross-border 
disease spread that was caused by and would create problems for the growing international 
traffic of goods and persons.34 Given that the problem of health security is perceived as 
‘global’, an effective response has to be global too.
yet the problem with implementing interventionist policies on a global scale is that they 
create particular political sensitivities with regard to national sovereignty. In the field of 
global health security this has been observed in particular with regard to developing coun-
tries. Several studies have pointed out that the security interests behind the securitisation of 
global health are mainly those of governments in north America and Western Europe, while 
the origin of the problem is considered to reside largely in the developing world.35 When an 
infectious disease becomes securitised, there is thus a tension between the perceived need 
for rapid intervention across countries, on the one hand, and a legal–political world order 
that is still largely based on the principle of national sovereignty, on the other.
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Technological solutions become particularly attractive in this context not only because 
they are hoped to work rapidly, but because they may appear politically more neutral, min-
imising the risk of difficult political confrontations. In this political context there is a turn 
towards technological measures, such as ‘medical response, standardized protocols for 
managing global health crises, surveillance and reporting systems, or simple technological 
fixes like mosquito nets or drugs’.36 Even a cursory glance at the global health governance 
architecture that has emerged in the past 20 years reveals a plethora of institutions providing 
technological health interventions. In the field of global health this impetus for technological 
solutions is certainly not confined to pharmaceuticals. Surveillance systems, for example, are 
another prominent technological response. Such disease surveillance systems have been 
established and expanded at both at the national level and international levels.37
However, if pharmaceuticals are clearly not the only technological response, they remain 
a highly significant one. Indeed, policies and institutions to promote the international provi-
sion of pharmaceuticals have proliferated in the past 15 years. Prominent examples include 
the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, GAVI, the WHO Prequalification 
Programme (to serve as an international reference point for good-quality medicines and 
vaccines), the WHO Global Pandemic Influenza Action Plan (to increase the supply of vac-
cines), the Directly Observed Treatment, Short-Course (DOTS) programme at the heart of 
WHO’s Stop TB Strategy, and a range of cross-sectoral partnerships for the development of 
new pharmaceuticals, such as Aeras, DnDi, the Medicines for Malaria Venture, PATH and the 
TB Alliance, to name but a few.
Technological interventions are an attractive policy instrument not only because they 
promise a quick-fix and a politically more neutral solution but also because such interven-
tions can immensely reduce ‘the scale of intervention, from global political economy to 
laboratory investigation and information management’.38 For governments in north America 
and Western Europe, in particular, it is much easier to mobilise resources and domestic polit-
ical support for interventions that seemingly focus on a precise target in a circumscribed 
event with direct security relevance for domestic populations, rather than for long-term 
engagement with complex socioeconomic problems whose domestic relevance is uncertain.
Such a process was also evident in the international response to the Ebola outbreak in 
West Africa. The portrayal of the epidemic as a security threat invoked the sense of immi-
nent danger and perceived need for rapid action that Buzan and Weaver have pointed out. 
Specifically the securitisation of the outbreak created a focus on containment and control 
strategies, which privileged a policy pathway based on rapid, largely technological inter-
ventions to enhance surveillance, diagnosis and treatment.39 Technologies provided by 
the international community included laboratories and treatment centres, infection and 
prevention control capacity, personal protective equipment, and diagnostics. Furthermore, 
governments – especially those in the USA and Europe – WHO and several nGOs emphasised 
the development of new medicines and vaccines as an important element of outbreak con-
tainment and control. It was suggested that ‘the window of opportunity for containing the 
epidemic, using “classical” control tools was closing’,40 and that new medicines and vaccines 
would both ‘dramatically strengthen the ability to counter the disease’ and ‘act as an insur-
ance policy against future outbreaks’.41 As described elsewhere in this article, measures to 
accelerate the development of new pharmaceuticals were among the first steps taken after 
the Ebola outbreak had been declared a Public Health Emergency of International Concern, 
and several hundred million US dollars were mobilised in the following months.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 Su
sse
x L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
4:0
0 1
1 M
arc
h 2
01
6 
494  A. ROEMER-MAHlER AnD S. ElBE
The Ebola outbreak in West Africa illustrates once more how the securitisation of a health 
issue can contribute to a pathway of policies that focus on technological – and often phar-
maceutical – fixes, rather than encouraging a more long-term approach that deals with the 
socioeconomic and political determinants of the problem. The Ebola crisis emerged in the 
context of stark inequalities – both local and global – and has been interpreted as a mani-
festation of ‘structural violence’.42 The international community has accepted that structural 
factors such as weak national health systems have contributed to the crisis, and committed 
to strengthening health systems in developing countries. yet this commitment has so far 
focused on technical capacity building, while neglecting the political and socioeconomic 
context that has brought about those weaknesses. Almost two years after the beginning of 
the outbreak, long-term approaches to ‘fixing’ some of the structural conditions in which 
the crisis emerged are yet to take a prominent place in the international Ebola response.
Exceptions: extraordinary measures for pharmaceutical innovation
Securitisation processes create space ‘to use extraordinary means or break normal rules for 
reasons of security’.43 The use of extraordinary measures in the context of health security has 
already received much attention in the literature. Some scholars have noted that the securi-
tisation of health has contributed to the extraordinary mobilisation of money, resources and 
political commitment.44 nevertheless, the space created for extraordinary measures can also 
be used to weaken civil liberties, human rights and democratic procedures.45 In the Ebola out-
break three such exceptional measures have been critical for the pharmaceutical response: 
extraordinary amounts of funding were mobilised to promote the development of Ebola 
drugs and vaccines, experimental medicines that had never been tested in humans were 
given to Ebola patients, and candidate drugs and vaccines were rushed into clinical trials.
First, in recognition of the threat that some infectious diseases also pose to security, gov-
ernments have mobilised enormous financial resources for the development of medicines 
and vaccines. In the first six months of the international Ebola response, the USA alone 
authorised more than $500 million to support accelerated development and manufacture, 
‘in keeping with the President’s charge that we tackle Ebola as a national security priority’.46 
The largest UK medical science funding organisation, the Wellcome Trust, provided £3.2 
million to fund a clinical trial consortium to tackle ‘one of the most virulent infectious agents 
known to man, [which] has been declared a threat to international peace and security’.47 The 
EU Innovative Medicines Initiative provided €215 million to fund eight vaccine development 
projects for the Ebola ‘emergency’,48 and GAVI pledged to provide $300 million to purchase up 
to an estimated 12 million doses of a vaccine once it was ready and recommended by WHO.49
Moreover, most of the drugs and vaccines that were rushed into clinical development 
had already benefitted from health security funding released in the aftermath of the terrorist 
attacks in the USA in 2001. The pharmaceutical response to the Ebola outbreak, therefore, 
came against the background of governments mobilising much larger sums of funding over 
the past 15 years to encourage the development of new medicines and vaccines against a 
range of health security threats. For example, the US government had provided $5.6 billion 
for the purchase and stockpiling of medicines and vaccines against diseases considered a 
health security threat through the Project Bioshield Act in 2004.50 Before that the US Congress 
had already increased the bio-defence budget of the US national Institutes of Health (nIH) 
from $53 million in 2001 to $1.7 billion in 2005, although nIH funding essentially flat between 
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2004 and 2014.51 PEPFAR has been provided with some $60 billion since 2003,52 while $7.5 
billion was pledged to GAVI in 2015.53 In the name of security, therefore, governments have 
increasingly intervened in the play of normal market forces – which control the development 
of routine medicines and vaccines - and have channelled public funds into programmes for 
the development and procurement of pharmaceuticals against perceived health security 
threats.
Second, the sense of urgency created by framing the Ebola outbreak as a security threat 
created exceptional policy space to facilitate the use of drugs that had never been tested 
in humans. At a very early stage in the international Ebola response, at the 11 August WHO 
meeting, a consensus was ‘reached…that it is ethical to offer unproven interventions with as 
yet unknown efficacy and adverse effects, as potential treatment or prevention’.54 Moreover, 
WHO, the US government, researchers and funding bodies urged national regulators to 
consider new regulation on how to approve experimental drugs and vaccines.55 Regulation 
on the use of experimental drugs beyond the area of research exists only in a few countries, 
such as in Europe and the USA, which allow for the use of unapproved pharmaceuticals in 
emergency situations. Under normal circumstances the rules governing the use of new drugs 
and vaccines require their extensive testing in humans in lengthy clinical trials. There are 
several reasons for this. Only about 10% of drugs and vaccines that show promising results 
in the laboratory and animal studies are found to be safe and effective in humans.56 Giving 
experimental drugs and vaccines to patients may therefore cause severe health damage. 
Furthermore, doing so can be a waste of resources if it deflects attention from other, poten-
tially more effective interventions. Finally, giving experimental drugs to patients outside 
clinical trials can compromise the systematic collection of data about their effects. yet, in 
the weeks following the WHO meeting, several patients received experimental treatments 
in Europe, liberia and the USA. Most patients received one or more experimental drug – 
including brincidofovir, convalescent blood and plasma, favipiravir, TKM-Ebola and ZMapp.57 
That use of experimental treatments in Ebola patients led to both extensive public attention 
being paid to the new ‘miracle drugs’ and to considerable controversy about the use of 
experimental drugs for Ebola.58
Third, the emergency environment around Ebola created exceptional possibilities for 
exploring how the development and distribution of medicines and vaccines could be accel-
erated – even before their efficacy and safety was fully understood. A series of meetings 
and teleconferences was held at WHO on how to speed up clinical development, including 
unblocking some of the ethical, financial and regulatory issues involved.59 According to WHO, 
the discussions were characterised by ‘a high sense of urgency’.60 Indeed, almost all available 
meeting documents make reference to the emergency nature of the situation, to the fact 
that it was ‘unprecedented in scale and geographical distribution’,61 to the ‘escalating scale 
and mortality of the outbreak’,62 and to the need for ‘immediate action’.63
The key question was how to accelerate to only a few months a process that would usu-
ally take several years. One idea was that, rather than running the different stages of drug 
development – such as designing clinical studies, applying for ethical and regulatory review, 
conducting the studies, licensure and distribution – sequentially, they had to be done largely 
in parallel.64 This required the rapid mobilisation of resources, mentioned above, and an 
unprecedented level of coordination between industry, regulators, scientists and funders, 
which was achieved though the rapid formation of large consortia of organisations from 
different sectors and countries.
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Accelerating clinical development and approval also required greater international har-
monisation of regulation. In november the African Vaccine Regulators Forum agreed to 
conduct joint ethical and regulatory reviews of clinical trials in Africa.65 This was put into 
practice one month later by the national ethics and regulatory authorities in Cameroon, 
Ghana, Mali, nigeria and Senegal, which held a joint review for the approval of an advanced 
vaccine trial. Meanwhile, WHO began work on an emergency regulatory pathway for Ebola 
vaccines,66 but specific requirements had not been announced by the time of writing.
Finally, accelerating the development and approval of medicines and vaccines also 
required an acceptance by all parties that decisions had to be made in situations of con-
siderable uncertainty with regard to the reliability of the data that could be collected from 
clinical trials and, ultimately, the safety of the products. The need ‘to balance the imperative 
for immediate action to control the outbreaks with ensuring that measures employed were 
appropriate, safe, and effective’67 was recognised in several discussions. All groups empha-
sised that patient safety, good science and reliable data were paramount.68 yet, at the end 
of the day, it was also recognised that compromises would have to be made with regard to 
trial design and regulatory approval, for instance to be able to speed up development and, 
moreover, to do this in a situation of an acute outbreak with extremely high mortality rates.69
The extraordinary measures implemented to both facilitate the use of experimental drugs 
and accelerate the clinical development of drugs and vaccines thus employed risk calcula-
tions that differed from the respective procedures used under non-emergency conditions. 
The assessment of the risks weighed against the potential benefits of these measures had 
changed. In a situation of a perceived ‘emergency’ and ‘threat to security’, it seems easier 
to justify risks as acceptable. This observation has also been made by others studying the 
implementation of new technologies in the context of health security interventions. In a 
study on the Smallpox Vaccination Programme in the USA, Dale Rose found that, under the 
new security rationale, there was a willingness to accept a much higher risk of side-effects 
of the vaccine than had been acceptable from a public health rationale.70 A similar logic 
seems to have been at play when decisions were made to expand the use of pharmaceutical 
interventions in the international Ebola response.
not only do securitisation processes encourage technological solutions, then, but the 
political urgency associated with them facilitates the implantation of extraordinary meas-
ures, notably the mobilisation of public funds for pharmaceutical development, the use 
of drugs that have never been tested in humans and the acceleration of pharmaceutical 
development. That is a second way in which securitisation processes have encouraged and 
facilitated pharmaceutical response strategies.
Institutionalising pharmaceutical responses to health security threats
The extraordinary measures taken to facilitate the pharmaceutical response to Ebola did not 
have to start from ‘scratch’. Rather, they could draw on an existing set of policies and legal 
institutions that had been created in the past two decades to facilitate the use of pharma-
ceuticals as a key instrument against health security threats. In other words, the securitisa-
tion of health has not only created space for extraordinary measures but it has also – over 
time – created a set of lasting institutions. Some of these have facilitated – indeed made 
possible – a pharmaceutical response to the Ebola outbreak.
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The fact that, when the outbreak occurred, experimental drugs and vaccines against 
Ebola existed that could be moved into clinical testing, was largely a result of the expan-
sion of bio-defence policies in the USA since the early 2000s. As mentioned above, most of 
the drugs and vaccines rushed into accelerated clinical trials had initially been developed 
through nIH bio-defence funding streams. For commercially operating pharmaceutical com-
panies investment in Ebola medicines and vaccines is of little interest because of a lack of 
commercial opportunities.71 And, while there were complaints that nIH budget cuts since 
the mid-2000s had hampered the development of Ebola pharmaceuticals,72 without public 
funding for health security hardly any drug or vaccine would have been ready for clinical 
testing when the outbreak occurred.
In addition to bio-defence funding for pharmaceutical development, three other rules 
created in the USA to facilitate pharmaceutical responses to health emergencies played a role 
in the Ebola response: the Emergency Use Authorization (EUA), the Animal Efficacy Rule, and 
legal liability protection for pharmaceutical companies. The EUA was established as part of 
the Project Bioshield Act and the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Reauthorization 
Act (2013). It can provide authorisation for the use of pharmaceuticals and medical devices 
that have not yet been fully tested for safety and efficacy.73 During the Ebola outbreak, several 
diagnostic tests were authorised under this rule.74 Before Ebola the EUA was invoked for a 
drug against anthrax, and for several products during the influenza A (H1n1) pandemic of 
2009.75 Other governments are also looking into introducing similar regulation. In Europe 
an agreement on strengthening health security reached in 2013 ‘provides for the possibility 
that the Commission recognises a situation of public health emergency for the purposes of 
conditional marketing authorisations for medicinal products’.76 This would allow accelerated 
marketing of medicinal products or vaccines in an emergency situation.
Another legal institution that has been referred to in the international Ebola response is 
the so-called Animal Efficacy Rule introduced in the USA in 2002. The Animal Efficacy Rule 
responds to the problem that many diseases that are considered health security threats 
occur only rarely – or not at all – in nature. Medicines and vaccines against such threats 
can often not be approved on the basis of human clinical trials. The reason for this is that 
disease outbreaks may be too short or involve too few people for large-scale clinical testing 
to be organised, and deliberately exposing humans to pathogens merely for the purpose of 
pharmaceutical development is considered unethical.
Under the Animal Efficacy Rule the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) can approve 
pharmaceuticals based on efficacy studies conducted with animal models rather than on 
human clinical trials. The product’s safety, however, has to be demonstrated in human studies. 
So far the Animal Efficacy Rule has been used for only a small number of products, including 
one to treat pneumonic plague and another one against anthrax.77 In Europe the European 
Medicines Agency (EMA) has initiated procedures for accelerating the availability of vac-
cines during an influenza pandemic, including a ‘mock-up procedure’ whereby a vaccine 
can be authorised on the basis of the virus strain that might cause a pandemic – before the 
pandemic has actually occurred; of an ‘emergency procedure’ that reduces the period of 
approval; and of a ‘modification’ procedure whereby a vaccine that was approved only for 
seasonal influenza can be modified and approved for pandemic influenza.78
At the time of writing neither the Animal Efficacy Rule nor the EMA initiatives has been 
used to approve drugs or vaccines against Ebola. yet the Animal Efficacy Rule is actively 
being considered to approve some of the drugs and vaccines currently undergoing clinical 
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trials.79 Originally it was hoped that at least some of the trials could be completed during 
the outbreak. Approval could then have been obtained on the basis of the data gathered 
during these trials. However, infection rates have been decreasing rapidly since the end of 
2014, which means that many trials have run out of patients, and those still ongoing may 
do so in the next few months – before sufficient data are generated. A report by the Center 
for Infectious Disease Research and Policy (CIDRAP) at the University of Minnesota and the 
Wellcome Trust therefore suggests that the Global Health Security Agenda, an international 
health security institution launched in February 2014, ‘could provide an effective mechanism 
to accelerate regulatory review and deployment of Ebola vaccines in the future’.80 Specifically 
the report calls on national regulators to harmonise regulation for pharmaceutical approval 
internationally, including by adopting measures like the Animal Efficacy Rule and the EUA.
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the WHO Prequalification Programme could 
be amended to also cover unapproved drugs and vaccines.81 The WHO Prequalification 
Programme is a key global health institution in facilitating access to pharmaceuticals because 
it forms a single point of reference for drug quality. Global health organisations can therefore 
also purchase easily from low-cost manufacturers in developing countries where regulatory 
standards are weak. yet, in its current form, the WHO Prequalification Programme cannot be 
used for experimental drugs and vaccines.
A third legal institution that has become of critical importance in the pharmaceutical 
response to the Ebola outbreak is the legal liability of manufacturers. This issue concerns the 
question of who pays for legal claims against pharmaceutical companies when side-effects 
or other injuries occur among people participating in accelerated clinical trials or receiving 
a medicine or vaccine that has been approved on the basis of only limited or no testing in 
humans. In 2005 the USA introduced protections against liability claims that may be brought 
against pharmaceutical companies that develop medicines and vaccines required in health 
emergencies. In the following years the mechanism was invoked in relation to anthrax bot-
ulism, to pandemic influenza and to smallpox.82
During the international Ebola response pharmaceutical companies, scientists, WHO, and 
the UK and US governments called for indemnity for the manufacturers involved in the 
development of Ebola medicines and vaccines.83 The US government issued a declaration 
that extended liability protection for two years for three experimental Ebola vaccines and 
also shielded the manufacturer of an experimental drug from legal liability84. However, the US 
government can provide protection only for claims brought in a US court, not internationally. 
The US Secretary for Health and Human Services, Sylvia Burwell, therefore called on other 
governments to enact similar regulation. As Burwell explained, ‘as a global community, we 
must ensure that legitimate concerns about liability do not hold back the possibility of devel-
oping an Ebola vaccine, an essential strategy in our global response to the Ebola epidemic 
in west Africa’.85 To address this problem, WHO suggested that a group of donors, in collab-
oration with the World Bank, could be formed to establish an international liability fund.86
The international Ebola response shows, therefore, how policies and legal institutions 
established in the name of health security can facilitate the recourse to pharmaceutical 
policy strategies. The international Ebola response has built on existing institutions to pur-
sue a pharmaceutical approach, such as national bio-defence funding and legislation to 
approve experimental drugs and protect manufacturers from legal liability. Moreover, the 
move towards greater international harmonisation of clinical trial and approval procedures, 
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as well as liability protection, has further advanced the process of building institutions that 
facilitate the use of pharmaceuticals as a key instrument of global health governance.
Conclusion
This article has highlighted two pivotal dynamics that characterise the international Ebola 
response and indeed global health governance more broadly: (1) the framing of health as a 
security issue; and (2) the provision of pharmaceuticals as a key instrument of global health 
governance. In exploring the ways in which these two processes are linked in practice the 
article has identified three mechanisms or pathways through which the securitisation of 
infectious disease subtly, but powerfully, encourages pharmaceutical policy responses.
First, the framing of health as an issue of national and international security invokes a 
sense of imminent danger that creates a perceived need for immediate intervention and a 
quick fix. Alternative policy pathways, such as long-term socioeconomic changes, appear 
much less appropriate in a situation of perceived emergency. Moreover, as international 
intervention is difficult in a world order still dominated by national sovereignty, it creates a 
bias for interventions that are perceived as politically neutral. In that context technologies, 
including pharmaceutical technologies, become politically attractive. Although pharmaceu-
ticals are certainly not the only technological ‘solution’ that comes into play in this context, 
they are one of the most important.
Second, the framing of health as a security issue has created an exceptional political space 
in which extraordinary funding could be mobilised for developing medicines and vaccines, 
not only against Ebola but against a range of health threats. Moreover, the securitisation of 
health has also created exceptional political space to break key norms and rules governing 
the development and approval of drugs and vaccines. Medicines that had never been tested 
in humans were given to Ebola patients, and procedures put in place to speed up clinical 
tests in ways that would not normally be possible.
Finally, the securitisation of health has created a lasting institutional architecture for phar-
maceutical response strategies that the international Ebola response was able to draw upon, 
and which it has advanced further. Of particular importance here were national institutions 
in the USA such as the EUA, Animal Efficacy Rule and liability protection for manufacturers. 
During the Ebola outbreak this institution-building process has been pushed further ahead 
by efforts to increase the international harmonisation of regulation of clinical trials and 
approval procedures, as well as liability protection.
There is, of course, no doubt that improved access to pharmaceuticals enabled by various 
global health governance institutions in the past two decades has done much to improve 
people’s health and saved countless lives, including through access to anti-retrovirals for HIV 
and to childhood vaccines. However, by focusing policy attention largely on providing access 
to drugs, vaccines and other medical technologies, there is also a danger of obscuring the 
complex socioeconomic and political determinants of health. Indeed, there is a risk of obscur-
ing the fact that pharmaceutical and other technologies work in specific socioeconomic 
contexts that shape their efficacy.87 The reason that infectious diseases, such as Ebola, tend 
to spiral out of control mostly in low-income countries is the result of weak health systems, 
poverty, legacies of war, and deeply unequal global power relations, to name but a few of 
the complex issues underlying this catastrophe. Indeed, these issues have been recognised in 
public and policy debates from the beginning of the outbreak. Moreover, there have always 
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been significant doubts that the drugs and vaccines rushed into accelerated development 
would be ready to help the people affected by the Ebola outbreak.
yet, despite the public acknowledgement of the socioeconomic dimensions of this epi-
demic, millions have been spent on a pharmaceutical response to the Ebola outbreak – and 
billions more in the past two decades on a pharmaceutical approach to strengthening global 
health security. Many scholars have pointed out that the global health security agenda is 
driven by the national interests of governments in north America and Western Europe, 
and that the policy focus therefore is on containment rather than the prevention of epi-
demics. nevertheless, many public health experts have continued to express doubts that a 
pharmaceutical response was appropriate to achieve containment. Hence this explanation 
does not seem entirely satisfactory. To understand the focus on pharmaceuticals as a key 
instrument of global health policy, we need also to look at how the framing of health as a 
security threat has established political rationales, practices and institutions of governance. 
Moreover, the subtle but powerful ways in which the securitisation of infectious diseases 
reinforces pharmaceutical strategies in global health governance must be included in the 
ongoing process of their normative and political evaluation.
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